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THE INTERACTIVE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT ACCOUNTING CONTROLS
ON SUBORDINATES' BEHAVIOUR AND PERFORMANCE

Abstract

Prior research suggests that goal setting and an emphasis en meeting tight

budget targets may influence the extent of subordinates' performance and slack creation.
This study hypothesizes that other accounting controls may moderate these relationships.
Specifically, it hypothesizes that: (i) budgetary performance is increased and (ii)
budgetary slack creation is decreased when an emphasis on setting and meeting tight budget
targets is complemented with a high extent of cost control. The results support a significant
two-way interaction between Emphasis on setting and meeting tight budget targets and Cost
control affecting budgetary performance. A significant two-way interaction between
Emphasis en setting and meeting tight budget targets and Cost control affecting the
propensity to create slack was also found for production managers. Marketing managers'
propensity to create slack was found to be associated only with Emphasis en setting and
meeting tight budget targets.

Keywords: Tight budget targets, cost control, performance, slack.

THE INTERACTIVE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT ACCOUNTING CONTROLS
ON SUBORDINATES' BEHAVIOUR AND PERFORMANCE

Prior studies suggest that the setting and meeting of tight and attainable budget targets
may be associated with subordinates' performance and budgetary slack creation (Becker &
Green, 1962; Locke & Latham, 1984; Kren & Liao, 1988).

The setting and meeting of tight

but attainable goals may encourage subordinates to internalize budget goals, leading to a
higher level of aspiration, motivating subordinates to exert a disproportional amount effort
to attained the budgets, thereby improving their performance. High reliance en meeting
budget targets as a criterion for evaluating subordinates' performance may provide the
incentive for subordinates to create budgetary slack (Hopwood, 1972; Onsi, 1973; Canunann,
1976; Merchant, 1985a; Dunk, 1993).

Emphasis en meeting budget target however is only one of the many types of accounting
controls existing in organizations (Simons, 1987). Whilst there is empirical evidence to
support the expectation that an emphasis en tight budget targets interact with different
busines~_strategy to affect performance (Simons, 1987), the interaction between an emphasis
en tight budget targets and other types of accounting controls affecting subordinates'
performance and dysfunctional behavior have not been previously explored. In particular,
the moderating effects of other compensatory accounting controls, such as cost control, that
may be implemented jointly with an emphasis en setting and meeting tight budget targets
have been omitted in prior studies.

Accounting controls constitute an important form of controls existing in many organization for
motivating subordinates and influencing their behaviour (Lawler

&

Rhode, 1976;

Flamholtz, 1979; Euske, 1984, Merchant, 1985b). Merchant (1985b) regards the accounting
information system as useful for control purpose because they provide information that is
useful for motivating, monitoring, and decision making.

However different forms of

accounting controls may affect subordinates' performance and behavior differently. Chow,
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Kato & Merchant (1996, p.179) argue that "Controls can serve as complements or substitutes
for one another, and they also may differ in both magnitude and area of impact."

This

suggests that organizations may need to implement different forms of accounting controls
simultaneously to achieve the desired outcome and behaviour.

Hence accounting controls,

such as the extent of budget emphasis in performance evaluation should not be viewed in
isolation, but as a total package of accounting controls along with other nonaccounting
controls to achieve the organizational objectives (Otley & Berry, 1980; Otley, 1980;
Flamho!tz, 1983; Merchant, 198Sb; Macintosh & Daft, 1987; Chow et al., 1996).

For

instance, Macintosh & Daft (1987, p.50) argue that accounting controls " ... may seem an adhoc collection of techniques and mechanisms, but in many cases they are the tangible
elements of a strategy to create an integrated organization control package."

This suggests

the need to explore the impact of the moderating effects of other accounting control oo the
relationships between an emphasis oo tight budget targets and subordinates' performance
and dysfunctional behavior.

Different fonns of accounting controls occur at various phases, namely, at the planning
phase, during the implementation phase and after the implementation phase. Two forms
of common accounting controls, namely, planning and cost control, are necessary for control
systems to be effective. Homgren, Foster & Datar (1997, p.4) define planning as "choosing
goals, predicting results under various ways of achieving those goals, and then deciding
how to attain the desired goals"; and control as "action that implements the planning
decision and the performance evaluation of the personnel and operations."

The

management accounting literature suggests that effective planning and effective control are
both crucial for achieving organizational objective (Welsch, 1976; Homgren et a/.,1997).
Effective planning ensures that goals are carefully chosen and effective control ensures that
the chosen plan of action is implemented accordingly, thereby ,ensuring that the chosen
goals are attained Planning without the complementary control will be unsuccessful.
Similarly, controls are not meaningful unless proper planning is in place. This suggests that
whilst an emphasis on tight budget targets may be a necessary condition for improving
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subordinates' performance and minimize subordinates' dysfunctional behaviour, it may not
be the only condition. An effective cost control system must also be in place to complement
the tight budget target set. To-date, these relationships have remained largely untested.
Since planning and cost control constitute two of the most common forms of accounting
controls, ... better understanding of their effects en subordinates' performance and behaviour
will have important theoretical and practical implications.

In the next section, the relevant studies are examined to develop a theoretical basis for the

hypotheses to be tested. The following sections respectively describe the method, results
and their implications for theory and practice.

HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Role of accounting systems in restricting slack creation
Birnberg, Turopolic & Young (1983) suggest that accounting controls can be used by superiors
to influence subordinates' behaviour. The importance of management accounting as a control
system is also emphasized in agency framework. Agency theories suggest that an agent
(subordinate), acting in self-interest, is capable of engaging in dysfunctional behaviours
known as adverse selections and moral hazards (Baiman, 1982). The principal (superior)
relies on accounting control system to influence or control the agent's actions. Since the agent
attaches disutility to effort, the agent will attempt to create slack (regarded as a form of
shirking), to maximize utility, as slack permits less effort to be expended.

As slack is

regarded as an inefficiency or a loss that occurs because of asymmetric pre-decision
information (Scapens, 1991), and as the principal is also a utility maximiser, the principal
will attempt to solicit the optimal effort from the agent through the choice of the
information systems, including the use of accounting controls.
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The principal can use accounting control systems in several ways to counter slack and
improve performance. First, the principal can bargain with agent to set standards and
targets considered acceptable to the former. Second, the principal can install accounting
controls to monitor and report on the agent's effort. Pope (1984) suggests that a major form of
counter-bias, which can impose significant restrictions on subordinates' ability to create
slack, is the use of controls over the quality of information.

He argues that "audit

verification procedures implemented by the owner, penalties for estimation errors and even
zero-based budgeting can all be viewed as formal controls en the quality of the information
communicated to the owner...To the extent that such controls are effective ... biasing will be
unattractive" (p.57). This suggests that the more sophisticated and intense are accounting
controls, the less successful will be subordinates' attempts to create slack.

Both moral hazard and adverse selection are the consequences of information asymmetry
because of the principal's inability to measure or infer whether the agent has expended the
appropriate amount of effort or selected the optimal decisions.

A number of researchers

(e.g., Schiff & Lewin, 1970; Otley, 1978; Young, 1985; Dunk, 1993) suggest that information
asymmetry is likely to lead to a higher incidence of budgetary slack creation. Otley {1978,
p.145), for instance, argues that "the essence of the control problem .. .is that there is a
degree of uncertainty in what constitutes an appropriate standard of performance for an
organizational unit, but that uncertainty is often greater to the superior than the
subordinate, who is more closely involved .... The so-called game of budget control...is
played in the area of uncertainty that lies between a superior's knowledge of a specific
situation and that possessed by his subordinate". Hence, any measures, which reduce the
amount of information asymmetry, are likely to reduce the agent's dysfunctional behavior,
including slack creation.

Since accounting control systems ( such as the planning systems,

the reporting systems and monitoring procedures), are based en information use 1, they are
likely to increase the amount of knowledge available to the superior. The possession of
more information is likely to increase the superior's ability to detect slack creation by the
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subordinates. If subordinates are aware that the superior has the ability to detect slack,
they are less likely to create slack. Hence their propensity to create slack will be reduced.

Role of accounting controls in improving perfonnance

Apart from reducing propensity to create slack, accounting controls may also lead to better
subordinates' budgetary performance. Budgetary performance is defined as the extent of
success by the subordinates to meet budgeted targets. Budgetary performance is high if the
subordinates' actual performance is close to or better than budgeted performance.

Since accounting controls are likely to reduce the extent of subordinates' propensity to create
slack, budgets are also likely to be accurately and realistically set. Accurate budgets, in
turn, are likely to lead to better budgetary performance as subordinates are likely to view
accurate budgets as realistic and attainable and hence are likely to be motivated to meet
the budgeted targets (Becker & Green, 1962; Otley, 1978).

Becker & Green (1962) suggest

that when subordinates view budgets as accurately and realistically set, they are also
likely to internalised the budget targets, leading to higher level of aspiration, which, in
tum, will motivate subordinates to put in more effort to try to achieve the budgeted targets.
In his study of superior's evaluative styles and budgetary performance, Otley (1978) also

found that subordinates' budgetary performance was positively associated with superior's
evaluative styles that emphasized the importance of meeting the budgets (budget
constrained style).

However, he also found that better budgetary performance was also

associated with more accurate and realistically set budget targets.

He concluded that the

better budgetary performance was not the consequence of the evaluative style, but rather
was caused by budget targets that were more accurately and realistic set . He explained the

relationship as follows: "It therefore appears that a major reason for performance being
closer to budget when budgetary means of evaluation are stressed is not so much that
performance improves, but that the budget is set at more realistic levels ... such realism in
budgets is also associated with performance that is acceptable .... " (pp 138-139).

As an

important purpose of accounting controls is to enhance the accuracy of accounting and budget
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information, accounting controls are therefore likely to improve the accuracy of budget
targets, and following Otley's argument, more accurate budgets are likely to be associated
with improved subordinates' budgetary performance.

"Path-goal" theory also suggests the importance of financial controls as a motivation
device for better performance particular! y among higher level management (Georgopoulos,
Mahoney & Jones, 1957; Ronen & Livingston, 1975; Macintosh, 1994).

For instance,

Macintosh (1994) suggests that "at upper levels, where role ambiguity runs high, managers
will welcome financial controls because their jobs are rife with uncertainty, ambiguity and
conflict. Here, financial controls, such as budgets, delineate managers' relationship with
their superiors, provide a communication channel with subordinates and help define
patterns of authority and responsibility.

Financial controls help these managers to

identify their goals as well as the proper path to reach them ... Not surprisingly, surveys
usually reported that upper level managers hold positive attitudes toward financial
controls." (p.35) (emphasis added). Hence, accounting controls are therefore hypothesized
to be positively associated with senior level managers' budgetary performance.

Operationalise of planning and control
Analyzing the results from his survey of 76 firms, Simons (1987) identifies 10 different
accounting control attributes. The two control system attributes of interest to this study are
"Emphasis m tight budget targets" and "Cost control" which are used to operationalise
planning and control, respectively.

Simons' accounting attributes are used by this study to operationalise accounting controls for
several reasons. First, Simons' framework allows more than a single form of accounting
control to be evaluated. Second, Simons' instrument covers a broader range of documents and
forms of controls than other available instruments, for instance, the Macintosh & Daft
(1987) instrument. Simons' instrument also permit controls to be classified on a purposebasis (e.g., cost control, results monitoring, external scanning) rather than just on the type of
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documents as in the case of the Macintosh & Daft instrument (e.g. budget, statistical
reports, standard operating procedures).

Additionally, the identification of different

forms of controls through an factor analysis by Simons, permits a more selective list of items
only, rather than the entire 33-item questionnaire, to be use in the present study.

The

classification of items into different forms of controls also permits the validity and
reliability of the instrument to be verified.

Emphasis on tight budget targets

Emphasis en tight budget targets is related to the

tightness and accuracy of departments' budget goals, the importance attached to the
meeting budgeted targets and the achievement of operating efficiencies and the use of
summary measures of departmental performance. Departments with a high Emphasis en
tight budget goals would attempt to set accurate and tight budget goals, require
subordinates to meet these tight budgeted targets and achieve operating efficiencies and
use overall summary measures to measure departmental performance.

Cost control

Cost control is defined by Simons (1987) as the extent to which cost analysis

techniques and control are used.

Departments with high Cost control would control

departmental operations by setting up cost centers, perform variance analysis and monitor
closely all operations and tasks in the department. The use of cost centers and variance
analysis are essential aspects of responsibility accounting which not only highlight
deviations of actual performance from budgets, but also enable the superior to pinpoint the
department and the individual responsible for the deviations and potential problems
areas.

This, together with control systems which monitor all tasks and operations, is

likely to make it difficult for subordinates to conceal any failure to meet budgeted targets.
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Two-way interaction between Emphasis on tight budget targets and Cost control
High Emphasis on tight budget targets - high Cost control situations
By itself, a high Emphasis on tight budget targets may not lead to a decreased propensity
to create slack or improved budgetary performance.

A high Emphasis on tight budget

targets is li.'.,ely to be effective only when it is accompanied by a high extent of Cost control.
Control refers to actions taken to achieve plans and involves the measurement of progress
when plans are implemented and the triggering of actions to correct or prevent any
deviations of actual performance from the budgets. However, control presupposes the
existence of effective planning.

Without effective planning, control is meaningless.

Similarly, without effective control, planning is meaningless as budgets are unlikely to be
achieved. Effective planning and control must both occur before budgets can be achieved.

Consequently, Emphasis oo tight budget target is likely to interact with Cost control to
affect subordinates' propensity to create slack and budgetary performance.

When

Emphasis oo tight budget target and Cost control are both high, it is likely that the
superior is highly

committed to using the accounting control system to achieve

organizational objectives. The setting of accurate and tight budget targets is likely to be of
paramount importance to the superior. In such situations, the superior is likely to view
slack creation unfavorably and is likely to intensify efforts to discourage slack creation.
When both control system attributes are high, the intensity and the sophistication of the
accounting controls in place are like! y to make it difficult for subordinates to create slack.
Subordinates are likely to be unable to create slack.

Since slack creation is not easy,

propensity to create slack is likely to be low. Moreover, because of the increased attention
on meeting tight budget targets, subordinates' budgetary performance is also likely to be

high.

High (low) Emphasis on tight budget targets - low (high) Cost control situations
In contrast, in situations when Emphasis oo tight budget targets is high (low) and Cost

control is low (high), the superior is likely to be less committed to using the accounting
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controls to restrict slack creation or to improve budgetary performance. Since it is likely
that both accounting controls must be present before slack creation can be restricted and
budgetary performance improved, it is plausible that slack creation will be possible when
only one of the accounting control is present.

Additionally, the presence of any one of the

accounting controls is likely to be enough to pressure subordinate to increase slack creation.
For instance, when Emphasis on tight budget target is high, subordinates are under pressure
to create slack because the importance attached to meeting the budget, coupled with the
tight budget targets, are likely to require a high level of effort from the subordinates.
Similarly, a high extent of Cost control directs the superior's attention to the subordinate
responsible for any deviations from the budget.

Subordinates are therefore likely to be

under pressure to avoid having unfavorable variances. Hence, they are likely to create
more slack under high Cost control situation than low Cost control situations to avoid the
negative stigma associated with unfavorable variances.

Hence, whilst the presence of both Emphasis on tight budget targets and Cost control makes
it difficult for subordinates to create slack because of the high intensity and sophistication
of the accounting controls, the presence of only one of the controls is likely to make it
possible for subordinates to create slack because of the lower intensity and sophistication of
the accounting controls. This, coupled with the pressure to create slack, is likely to lead to
a high propensity to create slack.

Low Emphasis on tight budget targets - low Cost control situations
Finally, when Emphasis on tight budget targets and Cost control are both low, the superior
is likely to place little importance to accounting controls to achieve organizational
objectives. Subordinates are therefore likely to be under no pressure or have any incentive to
create slack. Consequently, propensity to create slack is likely to be low.

Since there is a

lack of attention en the budgetary system by the superior, subordinates are unlikely to be
motivated to achieve high budgetary performance. Hence, budgetary performance is also
likely to be low.
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Based oo the above discussion, the following null and related alternative hypotheses are
tested:

Ho1

There is no significant interaction between Emphasis on tight budget
targets and Cost control affecting subordinates' Propensity to create
budgetary slack.

HAI

Emphasis on tight budget targets interacts significantly with Cost control
to affect subordinates' Propensity to create budgetary slack.

Ho2

There is no significant interaction between Emphasis on tight budget
targets and Cost control affecting subordinates' Budgetary performance.

HA2

Emphasis on tight budget targets interact significantly with Cost control to
affect subordinates' Budgetary performance.

Functional differentiation of activities

Researchers (e.g., Galbraith, 1973; Govindarajan, 1986; Kren & Liao, 1988) suggest that
• budgetary slack is a function of uncertainty. Since the levels of environmental uncertainty
(Thompson, 1967; Hayes, 1977; Brownell, 1982, 1985) as well as the level of task uncertainty
(Thompson, 1967; Hirst, 1981, 1983; Brownell & Hirst, 1986; Mia & Chenhall, 1988) faced
by the production function and the nonproduction functions (e.g., marketing) are likely to
differ, it is plausible that the results pertaining to the above hypotheses may be influenced
by functional differentiation. The appropriateness and hence the extent of reliance and use
of budgetary controls may also vary between different functional areas (Lawrence & Lorsch,
1967; Hayes, 1977).

Thompson (1967) suggests that since accounting control systems are

generally "arbitrary" and "socially invented", they are appropriate only " ... when
technologies are instrumentally perfected, and task environments stable or well buffered"
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(p.93). Since the production function faces a more homogeneous and stable environment than
nonproduction functions such as marketing, accounting controls may be relied upon more in
the production departments

than in marketing departments to measure subordinates'

performance. Similarly, Brownell (1982) suggests that "within the organization, the locus
of influence in decision making varied depending en the subenvironment faced by major
functional divisions. Boundary-spanning divisions, such as marketing, were characterized
by a much broader base of decision-making influence and control than those divisions
relatively buffered from the external environment, such as production" (p.129).

Empirically, Otley (1978) attributes his conflicting results with those of Hopwood (1972)
partly to the different type of operating units examined in the two studies. He examined
profit centers whilst Hopwood (1972) examined mainly cost centers. Similarly, Brownell
and Hirst (1986) emphasize the importance of the difference in their sample compared
with that of Brownell (1982).

Whilst Brownell (1982) examined mainly production

personnel, Brownell & Hirst's (1986) sample was more heterogeneous and their results are
stronger for the production subsample than for the nonproduction subsample. Hayes (1977)
results indicate strong support for his proposition that internal variables are the major
explanators of production department performance; whereas environmental variables are
most important in the explanation of the marketing department performance. Based en
these results, he concludes that accounting based performance evaluation measures are
• appropriate for production managers, but not for marketing and research and development
managers.

Brownell's (1985) results indicate that participation is more effective in

enhancing the performance of R & D departments than marketing departments.

Macintosh & Daft (1987) similarly found that departmental interdependence is related to
the emphasis placed en different forms of controls, with standard operating procedures
being more intensely used when interdependence was low; budget and statistical reports
being important when interdependence was moderate; and all forms of controls (standard
operating procedures, budget and statistical

reports)

being less

important

when

interdependence among departments was high. Finally, Mia & Chenhall (1994) found that
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functional differentiation of activities interacts significantly with broad scope MAS
information to affect performance. The impact of broad scope information on performance is
stronger for the marketing function than for the production function, a result they attribute
to the task uncertainty differences between production and marketing.

Hence there is strong theoretical justification as well as empirical evidence to suggest that
functional differentiation may influence the impact of accounting and budgetary controls.
Since Emphasis en meeting tight budget targets and Cost control are both related to
budgeting and accounting based control systems, it is probable that the models developed in
this study may be more applicable to the production function than to nonproduction functions
such as marketing.

Hence, apart from the combined sample (production and marketing

combined), the results of this study are also analyzed separately for the production and the
marketing subsamples.
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RESEARCH METHOD

A survey methodology involving a mailed questionnaire was used to test the hypotheses. A
total of 237 manufacturing companies located in the Australian States of Victoria (117
companies) and New South Wales (120 companies) each employing more than 100
employees were selected randomly from Kompass Australia 1993/94.2

As this study was designed to also examine the production departments and the marketing
departments separately, only companies with more than 100 employees were selected since
companies with less than 100 employees may not be organized oo a functional basis
(Brownell & Dunk, 1991). Only the heads of both the production and marketing functions
are selected to provide some degree of control for the level of seniority of the participants
within the organizational hierarchy.

The selection of a single manager from each

functional area also ensures independence of observations.

The selected companies were contacted by telephone to obtain the names of the two
functional heads so that the questionnaire could be mailed directly to, and answered by, the
intended participants.

Twenty one companies could not be contacted3 and thirty nine

companies reported that they were not actively involved in manufacturing in Victoria or
New South Wales. Of the remaining 177 companies, 143 companies agreed to assist in the
survey. This resulted in the identification of 143 production managers and 141 marketing
managers. The questionnaire was administered to a sample of only 237 managers selected
randomly from the 284 names obtained. Questionnaires were not mailed to all the names
provided as an approximate number of 240 questionnaires were considered adequate for the
survey. Moreover, managers who responded were provided with gift vouchers. Hence, only
237 questionnaires were mailed to keep the cost of gift vouchers to an affordable level.

The administration of the questionnaire involved the following steps.

First, a letter

explaining the objectives of the study was mailed to each of the intended participants.
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This was followed a week later by the questionnaire with a covering letter (assuring
participants confidentiality of information) and a reply-paid self-addressed envelope.
Since prior research has indicated that small monetary incentives enhance survey response
rates (Kanuk & Berenson, 1975; Heberlin & Baumgartner, 1978; Jaworski & Young, 1992),
each respondent was promised a gift voucher if the questionnaire was returned in a useable
form.

Reminder letters were mailed to those who had not responded after three weeks of

mailing of the questionnaire.

One hundred and eight responses and three "return to sender" were received.

Seven

organizations contacted by telephone indicated that the managers have already left their
organizations. This resulted in a response rate of 48%.

Four responses were not usable as

one respondent indicated that budgets were not used in the respondent's organization and
the other three responses were not answered by either the production or marketing
managers. This resulted in 104 usable responses.4

The respondents comprise 52 production managers and 52 marketing managers.

The

managers have a mean age of 43; have an average of 11 years of experience in their area of
responsibility; and have been in their current positions for an average of 4 years.

Fifty

seven percent of them have university qualifications and the average number of employees
in their areas of responsibility is 103.
respondents in general are highly

These demographic data indicate that the

qualified and experienced managers in highly

responsible positions.
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MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENTS

Propensity to create slack

Propensity to create slack was measured by Onsi's (1973)

instrument. The four-item Likert-scaled instrument measures the extent of the respondents'
agreement to the statements that a manager (i) submits a safely attainable budget to
protect himself/herself; (ii) sets different levels of standards with different levels of
management to be safe; (iii) accepts a reasonable level of slack during good business times;
and (iv) approves of slack as slack permits acts that cannot be officially approved to be
carried out. Onsi's instrument was selected for this study as it is a much more established
scale than Dunk's (1993) scale and has been tested and used by almost all the studies oo.
budgetary slack involving questionnaire surveys with satisfactory reliability and validity
(e.g., Merchant, 1985a; Govindarajan, 1986; Nouri, 1994; Nouri & Parker, 1996; Lal, Dunk
and Smith, 1996).

The Cronbach alphas obtained in this study is 0.67. Whilst this alpha

is not high, it is above the 0.5 - 0.6 acceptable minimum (Nunnally, 1978; Merchant, 1985;
Shields & Young, 1993), and as high as that obtained by Dunk (1993) with his instrument.

A factor analysis also supported the unidimensional nature of the four items as they a 11
loaded satisfactorily on a single factor.

Budgetary performance

This was measured by a modified version of the instrument

developed by Kenis (1979). The instrument comprises a 2-item 7-point scale ranging from
"Very rarely" to "Nearly all the time".

Respondents were asked how often they meet

their budget goals; and how often they have favorable budget variances. This instrument
was chosen because the independent variables of Emphasis on tight budget targets and Cost
control are budget-related controls and are more likely to affect budgetary performance
rather than overall job performance (Brier & Hirst, 1990; Hirst & Lowy, 1990).

The

Cronbach alpha for this variable in this study is 0.68.

Emphasis on tight budget targets
scale developed by Simons (1987).

This variable was measured with a 5-item, 7-point
The instrument comprises questions relating to the
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tightness and accuracy of budget goals, the use of summary measures of departmental
performance, the importance of meeting budgeted targets and achieving operating
efficiencies.

The choice of this instrument is regarded as appropriate because this

instrument emphasizes the importance of meeting tight budget targets and not just meeting

budget targets. This distinction is important as it has been argued in this study that it is
the meeting of tight budget targets (and not just the meeting of budget targets) that will
affect the two dependent variables (propensity to create slack and budgetary performance).
The Cronbach alpha of 0.65 obtained for this study is considered adequate (Nunnally,
1978). The factor analysis indicates that the items of the instrument are unidimensional as
they all loaded satisfactorily on a single factor.

Cost control

Simons (1987).

Cost control was measured using a 3-item, 7-point scale also developed by
The instrument includes questions relating to the use of cost centers,

budgetary variance analysis and monitoring of all tasks by control systems. The Cronbach
alpha for this subscales for this study is 0.64. A factor analysis also indicates that all the
items loaded satisfactorily on a single factor.

Summary statistics for these variables and their intercorrelations are shown in Tables 1
and 2, respectively. As this research involves interaction regression models and non-ratio
• scales, the problem of multicollinearity is a non-issue (Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990; Gul &
Tsui, 1995). Gul & Tsui suggest that as the origins of non-ratio scales are arbitrary, the
correlations between the independent variables can be reduced to zero by shifting the origin
points of the scales. The signs and significance level of the interaction coefficients are not
affected by any shift of the origin point.

Insert Tables 1 and 2 here
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RESULTS

Regression models are used to analyze the data. The following models are used:

Yi= bo + b1Ti + b3Ci + ei

(Equation 1)

Yi= bo + b1 Ti+ b2Ci + b3TiCi + ei

(Equation 2)

where Yi

=

Propensity to create slack (Ho 1) or

=

Budgetary performance (Ho2 )
Emphasis on tight budget targets
Cost control

Ti
Ci
Pi

=

ei

=

Propensity to create slack
5
Error term

=

Hypothesis Hof Propensity to create slack
Table 3 sho.ws the results of the regressions of Propensity to create slack en Emphasis oo
tight budget target and Cost control. The results indicate that for the combined production
and marketing manager sample, the main effect (Equation 1) of both Emphasis en tight
budget targets and Cost control are significant (p :S 0.001 and p :::;; 0.015, respectively). The
results also indicate that for Equation 2, the coefficient of the interaction term (b3 ) is
2

• significant at p<0.039. The R of the two-way interaction model increases by 2.8% from the
main effect model to 12.3%.

Insert Table 3 here

For the production subsample, Table 3 indicates that only Emphasis en tight budget targets
has a significant and negative main effect en propensity to create slack (p :::;; 0.022 in
Equation 1). Cost control has no significant main effect. The results also indicate that the
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coefficient (b 3) of the two-way interaction between Emphasis en tight budget targets and
Cost control is, as expected, significant (p

~

0.005, Equation 2) and negative.

2

The

2

incremental R explained by the two-way interaction is 12% with the R of the main effect
model (Equation 1) increasing from 8.1 % to 20.1 %.

For the marketing subsample, Table 3 indicates that only Emphasis en tight budget target
has a significant (p

~

0.026, Equation 1) and negative main effect.

Both Cost control and

the interaction between Cost control and Emphasis en tight budget targets are not
significant. Hence, hypothesis H 01 , which states that there is no significant interaction
between Emphasis en tight budget targets and Cost control affecting Propensity to create
slack, is rejected only for the production managers ..

The failure to reject Hypothesis H 01 for the marketing function could be due to the lesser
importance attached to Cost control in the marketing departments where revenues, rather
than costs, are likely to be the paramount object of control. Marketing departments are
likely to place greater emphasis en economic and environmental conditions and use less
formalized accounting control procedures, because market innovation and administrative
controls may be incompatible (Simons, 1987). In contrast, production departments are likely
to use formal accom1ting controls (such as Cost control) to control their operations
(Thompson, 1967; Hayes, 1977; Hirst, 1981, 1983, Simons, 1987), because cost incurrence is
likely to constitute a more significant aspect of the production departments' operations
than those of the marketing departments. This may explain why a significant interaction
between Emphasis en tight budget targets and Cost control affecting Propensity to create
slack was foWld for the production function but not for the marketing function.
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Further analyses on the significant interaction for the production subsample

To ascertain if Cost control exerts a positive influence on Propensity to create slack over the
entire range of Emphasis on tight budget targets for the production subsample, the
procedure suggested by Schoonhoven (1981) is used to determine the point of inflexion of the
partial relation
Emphasis m

ay /c)Ti,

that is, the level of Cost control at which a change in the

tight budget targets has

Mathematically,

no effect

on propensity to create

slack.

the relation between Emphasis on tight budget targets (Ti) and

propensity to create slack (Yi) as influenced by Cost control (Ci) can be shown as:

ay /dTi =

b1 + b3Ci.

The point of inflexion for the production subsample is 14.3, calculated as: -b1/b3.

As the

observed range of Cost control scores for the production subsample is between 7 and 21 and the
mean is 16.74, the point of inflexion lies within the observed range and is close to the mean.
Emphasis on tight budget targets therefore has a nonmonotonic effect m Propensity to create
slack over the observed range of Cost control.

This means that even though Emphasis m

tight budget targets has a significant main effect m propensity to create slack (p

~

0.022,

Equation l, Table 3), this main effect is not meaningful (Kerlinger & Pedhazur, 1973, p. 246)
as the effect of Emphasis m tight budget target is positive in the Cost control range below
14.3 and negative in the range above 14.3. These relationships are shown in Figure 1.

Insert Figure 1, Table 4 and Figure 2 here

To further assist in the interpretation of the significant results pertaining to the t~o-way
interaction between Emphasis on tight budget targets and Cost control affecting Propensity
to create slack for the production subsample, both Emphasis on tight budget targets and Cost
control are dichotomized at their respective means and the results presented in Table 4 and
Figure 2. Table 4 and Figure 2 indicate that a compatible combination of high Emphasis m
tight budget targets and high Cost control has the lowest mean score (11.8) of propensity to
create slack. This is consistent with the hypothesis that for accounting controls to be
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effective in reducing Propensity to create slack, there should be a high extent of planning
and setting accurate and tight budget and a high extent of control and follow-up to ensure
that planned targets are achieved.

Table 4 and Figure 2 indicate that Propensity to create slack is also low with a compatible
combination of low Emphasis on tight budget targets and low Cost control (mean score

=

12.5). Since both the accounting controls are low, it is plausible that top management is
relying en other forms of control to achieve operating efficiency.

There is therefore ro

incentive for subordinates to build slack. Hence, the Propensity to create slack is low.

Table 4 and Figure 2 indicates that Propensity to create slack is high when Emphasis m
tight targets is high and Cost control is low (16.2); and when Emphasis en tight targets is

low and Cost control is high (14.5). These results indicate that Propensity to create slack is
highest when there is inconsistency in the implementation of the two accounting control
system attributes and hence are consistent with the theory that the effectiveness of the two
accounting control system attributes is dependent upon the joint application of the two
attributes. Whilst the presence of only one of the two control system attributes is not likely
to create fear among subordinates that slack creation will be detected (because of the low
sophistication of accounting controls), it is nevertheless still likely to induce the stress and
the pressure for the subordinates to create slack. Hence, Propensity to create slack is high
when only one of the two control system attributes is present.

The results indicate that a high Emphasis on tight budget targets is associated with the

highest level of propensity to create slack (16.2) when it is not implemented with a high
Cost control; but is associated with the lowest level of Propensity to create slack (11.8)
when it is implemented jointly with a high Cost control.

These results highlight the

importance of Cost control and suggest that the failure to control for the extent of Cost
control may account for the conflicting results of prior studies which examined the impact of
the importance of Meeting the budget on Propensity to create slack.
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Table 4 also indicates that the high Emphasis on tight budget targets and high Cost control
combination (which is the most effective combination for reducing Propensity to create
slack) is also the cell with the highest number of respondent (18). The high Emphasis en
tight targets and low Cost control combination, which is the least effective combination in
reducing Propensity to create slack, has the lowest number of respondents (5).

This

combination is unusual as a high Emphasis en tight budget targets is normally expected to
be accompanied by a high extent of Cost control. The ineffectiveness of this combination to
reduce Propensity to create slack may account for its unpopularity among the production
departments.

Hypothesis Ho 2 : Budgetary perfonnance
11'!

Table 5 presents the results of the regressions of Budgetary performance en Emphasis en
tight budget targets and Cost control. The results indicate that for the combined production
and marketing sample, both Emphasis en tight budget targets and Cost control have ro
significant main effects en Budgetary performance (Equation 1).

However, the results

indicate that the coefficient (b3} of the interaction between Emphasis en tight budget
targets and Cost control is, as expected, highly significant (p

~

0.008, Equation 2) and

2

positive. The two-way interaction increases the R of the main effect model by 5.5% to
• 10.4%. Similar results are obtained for both the production subsample and the marketing
subsample. Hypothesis H 02, which states that there is no significant interaction between
Emphasis en tight budget targets and Cost control affecting Budgetary performance, is
rejected for both the production and marketing functions. This suggests that a combination
of high Emphasis on tight budget targets and a high Cost control is effective in increasing
subordinates' Budgetary performance in both the production and marketing departments.
Hence null hypothesis H02, which states that there is no significant interaction between
Emphasis en tight budget targets and Cost control affecting subordinates' Budgetary
performance, is rejected.
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II

Insert Table 5 here

To ascertain if Cost control exerts a positive influence on Budgetary performance over the
entire range of Emphasis on tight budget targets, the procedure suggested by Schoonhoven
(1981) is used to determine the point of inflexion of the partial relation ay ;aTi, that is, the
level of Cost control at which a change in the Emphasis on tight budget targets has ro
effect on Budgetary performance. The point of inflexion is 13 for the pooled (combined
production and marketing) sample.

As the observed range of Cost control scores for the

pooled sample is between 7 and 21 and the mean is 16.47, the point of inflexion lies within
the observed range of Cost control and is close to the mean. Emphasis on tight budget
targets therefore has a nonmonotonic effect on Budgetary performance over the observed
range of Cost control. Figure 3 shows that the effect of Emphasis en tight budget target is
positive over the range of Cost control above 13, and negative for the range of Cost control
below 13.

Insert Figure 3, Table 6 and Figure 4 here

• To further assist in the interpretation of the significant two-way interaction results, both
Emphasis en tight budget targets and Cost control are dichotomized at their respective
means and the results presented in Table 6 and graphically presented in Figure 4.

Table 6

and Figure 4 indicate that Budgetary performance is highest when Emphasis en tight
budget targets and Cost control are both high (10.65). These results are consistent with the
expectation that the highest level of Budgetary performance is associated with the cell
where both control system attributes are high.

Budgetary performance is lowest in the cell where both control system attributes are low
(mean= 9.36). The low emphasis on financial controls suggests that the budgetary system
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is probably not important and that other forms of control are in place to achieve efficiency.
Since the budgetary system is not important, achieving a high level of Budgetary
performance is probably also unimportant.

Hence, there are few incentives for the

subordinates to expend the effort to achieve high Budgetary performance.

As only organizations with budgetary systems are included in this study, and since a
compatible combination of high Emphasis oo tight budget targets and high Cost control is
associated with high Budgetary performance, it is not surprising that this combination has
the highest number of respondents (40 out of 104, Table 6).

The cell with the next highest

number of respondents (33) is the low Emphasis on tight budget targets and low Cost control
combination. This result is also not surprising as a low Emphasis oo tight budget target is
expected to be associated with a low emphasis oo Cost control. Finally, as expected, the
1;,I

other two cells, involving incompatible combinations of high (low) Emphasis oo tight
budget target and low (high) Cost control, have the lowest number of respondents (12 and
19, respectively).
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CONCLUSION

This study provides empirical evidence on the interactive effect of Emphasis on tight
budget targets and Cost control. These two accounting control system attributes are probably
among the

~ost commonly used accounting controls in many organizations.

Yet, it is

surprising that there is a dearth of research evidence on how these two control system
attributes interact to affect the achievement of organizational objectives.

The results of this study provide a plausible explanation for the prior studies' conflicting
results on the association between the importance of Meeting the budget and the Propensity
to create slack. The evidence suggests that the extent of Cost control may be the important
omitted variable in prior studies. Cost control interacts significantly with Emphasis en
tight budget targets to affect: (i) the production managers' Propensity to create slack; and
(ii) both the production and the marketing managers' Budgetary performance.

A number of limitations exist in this study. First, the measurement instruments for the two
accounting control system attributes are recently developed instruments and have not been
widely used. The moderate levels of Cronbach alpha for Emphasis on tight budget targets
and Cost control indicate a need for further refinement of these instruments or the use of
other alternative instruments to retest the hypotheses of this study. Second, the inclusion
of the word "slack" in the instrument for Propensity to create slack may have biased the
respondents' scores since the word "slack" generally has a negative social stigma (Dunk,
1993). Third, as the sample was derived from senior production and marketing managers of
private sector manufacturing organizations, the results of this study can only be generalized
to the senior management of the production and marketing functions of private sector
manufacturing organizations. Opportunities exist to extend this study to lower and middle
level management, to other functional areas (e.g., human resource management, accounting,
administration), to non manufacturing organizations and to public sector organizations.
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Opportunities also exist to examine the interaction effects of other accounting control system
attributes, such as External scanning and Results monitoring (Simons, 1987), on other
dependent variables, such as job-related tension, role conflict and role ambiguity.

Finally,

this study have only emphasized formalized accounting procedures and systems involving
information use. It has not considered informal control mechanisms such as social and
cultural control (Jaeger, 1983; Harrison, 1992) which could also influence subordinates'
propensity to create slack and performance. Testing the effects of these informal controls

will be beneficial.

Nevertheless, despite the limitations above, this study provides additional evidence
regarding the complex issue of budgetary slack and budgetary performance.

The focus m

the role of accounting system control attributes to counter slack also represents the
accoW\tants' and superiors' (rather than the subordinates') role in slack creation (reduction),
an interesting and relatively unexplored area in management accounting research.
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Footnotes

1.

Accounting control systems is defined as "formalized procedures and systems that use
information to maintain or alter patterns in organizational activity" (Simons, 1987,
p.358).

2.

Manufacturing companies were selected because the use of budgets in these
organizations is common. Non-manufacturing companies were excluded from the
sample to provide some control over factors arising from differences in activities
undertaken by manufacturing and non-manufacturing organizations. Victoria and
New South Wales were selected as these two states have the highest concentration
of manufacturing operations in Australia.

3.

These companies could have moved, ceased operations or changed their telephone
numbers.

4.

The non-response bias tests suggested by Oppenheim {1992) indicate that there were
no significant differences between the early and late respondents.

5.

Tests on the adequacy of the multiple linear regression models indicate that the inherent
assumptions of the models were satisfied by the data.
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TABLE 1: Descriptive statistics for independent and dependent variables

Variables

Theoretical range
Min
Max

Actual range
Max

Mean

Std dev

Emphasis on tight
targets

27.44

3.89

5

35

15

35

Cost Control

16.47

3.21

3

21

7

21

Propensity for slack

12.04

4.62

4

28

4

22

9.92

2.07

2

14

3

14

Budgetary performance

31

Min

TABLE 2: Correlation matrix
among independent and dependent variables

Variables

Cost control

Emphasis
on tight
targets

Cost
control

0.54 ....

Propensity for slack

-0.23•

0.05

Budget performance

0.21"'

0.17

....

.

Propensity
for slack

P::. 0.01
p:::. 0.05

..

32

-0.20·

.:·
,•

TABLE 3: Results of regression of Propensity to create slack on Emphasis on tight budget targets
and Cost control for the production managers, marketing managers and the combined group.

Variable

Coeff

Constant
Emphasis on tight targets (T)
Cost control (C)
TxC
<.,J
<.,J

R2
F value
p~
R2 explained by
2-way interaction terms =

ho
b1
b2
b3

Production function
Equation 1
Equation 2
(Main)
(Interaction)
Est
p
Est .
p

19.36
-0.38
0.25

0.001
0.022
0.142

0.081
2.17
0.063

-34.52
1.86
3.33
-0.13

0.050
0.017
0.003
0.005

0.201
4.04
0.006

12.0%

Marketing function
Equation 1
Equation 2
(Main)
(Interaction)
Est
p
Est
p

16.18
-0.395
0.349

0.001
0.026
0.072

0.077
2.05
0.070

14.18
-0.32
0.48
-0.01

0.248
0.342
0.362
0.461

0.077
1.34
0.136

0.0%

Combined production & marketing
Equation 1
Equation 2
(Main)
(Interaction)
Est
p
Est
p

17.95
-0.43
0.35

0.001
0.001
0.015

0.095
5.33
0.003

-6.71
0.55
1.85
-0.06

0.318
0.167
0.017
0.039

0.123
4.69
0.002

2.8%

'
'

_J

r

Figure 1
Relationship of Emphasis on tight budget targets, Cost control
and Propensity to create slack: Production subsample

dY

1.00

dTi
dY/ dTi=
l.86 -0.13 (Ci*)

0

21

7
Cost control

-1.00

*Ci= Cost control score
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TABLE 4: Cell mean, standard deviation and frequencies for Propensity to create slack across high
and low Emphasis on tight budget targets and Cost control (Production managers only)

Cost control
Emphasis on tight targets

Low

High

Low

High

y

=

12.5

y

=

14.5

Sy

=

4.3

Sy

=

3.9

n

=

13

n

=

16

y

=

16.2

y

=

11.8

Sy

=

3.9

Sy

=

4.8

n

=

5

n

=

18

-

35

Figure 2: Two-way interaction between Emphasis on tight budget targets and
Cost control affecting Propensity to create slack (Production managers only)

Propensity

16

14

12

I 1.8
10

Low

High

Emphasis on tight targets

CC = Cost control

36

..
TABLE 5: Results of regression of Budgetary performance on Emphasis on tight budget targets
and Cost control for the production managers, marketing managers and the combined group.

Variable

Coe ff

Constant
Emphasis on tight targets (T)
Cost control (C)
Tx C

uJ
'-l

n2
F value

p$
n2 explained by
2-way interaction terms =

bo
b1
b2
b3

Production function
Equation 1
Equation 2
(Main)
(Interaction)
p
Est
p
Est

4.37
0.12
0.11

0.033
0.091
0.166

22.79
-0.64
-0.94
0.04

0.018
0.074
0.061
0.040

Marketing function
Equation 1
Equation 2
(Main)
(Interaction)
Est
p
Est
p

8.75
0.03
0.05

0.001
0.359
0.325

23.47
-0.52
-0.92
0.04

0.004
0.054
0.049
0.039

Combined production & marketing
Equation 1
Equation 2
(Main)
(Interaction)
Est
p
Est
p

6.63
0.09
0.05

0.001
0.067
0.267

22.15
-0.52
-0.90
0.04

0.001
0.022
0.011
0.008

0.094

0.151

0.018

0.080

0.049

0.104

2.55
0.044

2.85
0.024

0.44
0.322

1.39
0.129

2.59
0.040

3.87
0.006

5.7%

6.2%

5.5%

Figure 3
Relationship of Emphasis on tight budget targets, Cost control and Budgetary performance:
Combined production and marketing managers sample
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TABLE 6: Cell mean, standard deviation and frequencies for Budgetary performance
across high and low Emphasis on tight budget targets and Cost control
(Combined production and marketing managers)
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Figure 4: Two-way interaction between Emphasis on tight budget targets
and Cost control affecting Budgetary performance
(Combined production and marketing managers)
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